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Abstract
This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop schedul-
ing problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of com-
pletion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each
job (consisting in a number of operations) to a different player, we
can construct a cooperative TU-game associated with any open shop
scheduling problem. We assign to each coalition the maximal cost
savings it can obtain through admissible rearrangements of jobs’ op-
erations. By providing a core allocation, we show that the associated
games are balanced. Finally, we relax the definition of admissible re-
arrangements for a coalition to study to what extend balancedness
still holds.
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1 Introduction
In a scheduling problem a set of jobs have to be executed by a number of
machines. Such a general formulation arises in many real life situations, like
manufacturing processes, computer science, logistics, etc. In this paper we
consider open shop scheduling problems introduced by Gonzalez and Sahni
(1976) in which n jobs consisting of m operations have to be processed on m
machine, each operation on a different machine. We do not allow preemp-
tions, the order in which jobs’ operations are processed is immaterial but two
operations of the same job cannot be processed simultaneously (for a survey
see Chapter 8 in Pinedo, 2012 or Chapter 6 in Leung, 2004).
By assuming that every job belongs to a player, that incurs some waiting
cost until she can leave the system and that there is an initial processing
schedule (let say first come, first served) we can take a game theoretical
approach. The main question is how to distribute the cost savings the players
can obtain by cooperation, whenever they rearrange their jobs to be processed
in an optimal way, minimizing total waiting costs.
Curiel et al. (1989) are the first to study one-machine situations with
weighted completion time as the cost-criterion from such cooperative point of
view. In order to obtain stable allocations of the total cost savings, where no
coalition receives less than the cost savings they can generate by themselves,
we need to determine first what rearrangements of their jobs’ operations
are allowed for the coalition. An accepted and broadly used definition of
admissible rearrangement for a coalition (Curiel et al., 1989) imposes that the
set of predecessors of a player not in the coalition on a machine should be the
same as initially. In our model, we also consider the weighted completion time
as the cost-criterion, but contrary to the most of the literature in the field
and due to machines may incur idle time, such condition does not prevent
players not in the coalition of being hurt. This forces us to impose additional
conditions on what should be admissible for a coalition.
Curiel et al. (2002) provide an extensive review of many scheduling prob-
lems that has been treated from this point of view. In particular, many
different multiple machine problems has been studied as parallel machines
(Hamers et al., 1999; Calleja et al., 2002) or flow shop problems (van den Nouweland et al.,
1992; Este´vez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2008).
The computational complexity of finding optimal schedules for open shop
problems to minimize the weighted sum of completion times has been well es-
tablished in the literature from Achugbue and Chin (1982). However, Adiri and Amit
(1984) provide two clear algorithms to obtain optimal schedules for unit open
shop scheduling problems, where all processing times of all operations are
equal and all players have the same linear cost function. In the main result
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of the paper we provide a stable allocation of the total cost savings obtained
by cooperation for unit open shop scheduling problems. Finally, we study
to what extend such allocation is still stable if we relax the definition of
admissible rearrangements for a coalition. We follow the same approach of
Curiel et al. (1993) and Slikker (2006) where operations of jobs in a coalition
are allowed to jump over operations of jobs not belonging to the coalition
whenever this does not hurt the interest (completion time) of jobs outside
the coalition. We obtain some positive results depending on the specifica-
tions of such relaxations. On the other hand, stable allocations may not
exist for weaker relaxation conditions. van Velzen and Hamers (2003) and
Musegaas et al. (2015) consider different relaxation approaches.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we intro-
duce unit time open shop problems and present some optimal schedules for
the weighted completion time criterion. Section 3 introduces the coalitional
game associated with an open shop scheduling problem with initial sched-
ule and discusses which rearrangements should be admissible for a coalition.
In Section 4, we show our main result, that is, the core of a unit open shop
scheduling game is non-empty. Finally, in Section 5, we study to what extend
balancedness still holds when we relax the definition of admissible rearrange-
ments for a coalition.
2 Open shop scheduling problems
An open shop scheduling problem consists of n jobs, N = {1, . . . , n}, each
of them consisting of m operations each one to be processed on a different
machine, being M = {1, 2, . . . , m} the set of machines. When no confusion
arises we denote by |N | = n the cardinality of the set of jobs and by |M | = m
the cardinality of the set of machines. Alternatively, we can think of a set
of players, any of them needing to finish a job that consists of m operations,
each of these operations to be processed on a different machine. Players and
jobs are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
The operation of job i ∈ N on machine j ∈ M is denoted by the pair
(i, j) and pji > 0 denotes the processing time of (i, j). We assume that all
operations have to be processed uninterrupted, that is, preemptions are not
allowed. Moreover, in an open shop scheduling problem the process order of
a job’s operations is immaterial, but two operations of the same job cannot
be processed simultaneously. Also, a machine cannot process more than one
job at a time.
A schedule is a mapping s : N×M → R+ that assigns to every operation
a starting time. The set of all feasible schedules, according to the open
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shop specifications, is denoted by S. Let s ∈ S, we denote the starting
time of operation (i, j) according to the schedule s by tji (s) := s(i, j). Since
no preemption is allowed, Cji (s) = t
j
i (s) + p
j
i is the completion time of the
operation (i, j) according to s. We denote the completion time of job i
according to s by Ci(s) = max
j∈M
Cji (s).
A scheme σ = (σj)j∈M is a collection ofm bijections, σ
j : N → {1, . . . , n},
one for each machine j ∈M , where σj(i) = k interprets the operation of job
(player) i on machine j is at position k according to scheme σ. In other
words, player i has the right to process her operation on machine j before
her n−k followers according to σj. The set of all possible schemes is denoted
by Σ. A feasible schedule s ∈ S is compatible with the scheme σ ∈ Σ if and
only if for all j ∈M and i, i′ ∈ N it holds
tji (s) < t
j
i′(s) ⇐⇒ σ
j(i) < σj(i′).
In the next example, we illustrate that a given scheme σ ∈ Σ admits a
number of different compatible admissible schedules. On the other hand, a
given schedule s ∈ S is clearly compatible with a unique scheme.
Example 1. Consider the open shop scheduling problem with N = {1, 2},
M = {1, 2}, pji = 1 for all i ∈ N and for all j ∈M , and consider the scheme
σ1 = σ2 = (1, 2). Then, σ admits, among others, the following two feasible
schedules s1 and s2:
m1 1 2 s1,
m2 1 2
m1 1 2 s2.
m2 1 2
In the first schedule machine 2 incurs idle time, while in the second schedule
machine 1 incurs idle time.
A semi-active schedule is such that there does not exist an operation
which could be started earlier without altering the processing scheme or
violating the restrictions on the processing of operations, according to the
open shop specifications. So, all machines start processing all operations as
soon as it is possible without violating the fact that two operations of the
same job cannot be processed at the same time. In Example 1, only the
feasible schedules s1 and s2 are semi-active. Observe that there is no one-
to-one correspondence between schemes and semi-active schedules for open
shop problems.
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Every job (player) i ∈ N has a waiting cost that is linear with respect to
the moment it can leave the system, i.e. the cost function of a job i ∈ N for
a given s ∈ S is of type ci(s) = αiCi(s) where αi > 0 is the weight or waiting
cost per unit time of player i. Our first aim is to find an optimal schedule
sˆN ∈ S that minimizes the weighted sum of completion times. Note that
since the waiting costs are non-decreasing with respect to the completion
time for all i ∈ N , then we only need to look at semi-active schedules.
Finding optimal schedules for such open shop situations is a difficult
computational problem and has been proved to be NP-hard even if there
are only two machines (see for instance Achugbue and Chin, 1982). Thus,
henceforth we restrict our attention to unit time open shop problems. In a
unit time open shop problem pji = p for all i ∈ N and all j ∈M , and αi = α
for all i ∈ N . Without loss of generality we assume that pji = 1 for all i ∈ N
and all j ∈ M , and αi = 1 for all i ∈ N . A unit open shop scheduling
problem is a pair (N,M).
Adiri and Amit (1984) provide two different optimal schedules for unit
time open shop problems minimizing the weighted sum of completion times.
For our purpose, here we introduce one of them:
Algorithm 2 (Adiri and Amit, 1984). Schedule operations of player i ∈ N
continuously, starting at the earliest possible time (respecting operations pro-
cessing restrictions) on machine i mod (m)1 until machine m. Then, move
to the earliest possible time (respecting operations processing restrictions)
on machine 1 and schedule continuously the remaining operations of player
i.
Next, we provide a unit time open shop scheduling problem with six
players and four machines to illustrate Algorithm 2.
Example 3. Consider (N,M) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} andM = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Then, an optimal schedule sˆN according to Algorithm 2 is:
m1 1 4 3 2 5 6
m2 2 1 4 3 6 5
m3 3 2 1 4 6 5
m4 4 3 2 1 6 5
,
which is only compatible with the associated scheme σ:
1For all x, y ∈ R, ⌊x⌋ := max{k ∈ Z | k ≤ x}, ⌈x⌉ := min{k ∈ Z | x ≤ k}, and
x mod (y) := x− y⌊x
y
⌋.
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σ1 1 4 3 2 5 6
σ2 2 1 4 3 6 5
σ3 3 2 1 4 6 5
σ4 4 3 2 1 6 5
.
As noted in Adiri and Amit (1984) if n = mk+l with k = ⌊ n
m
⌋ and l ≥ 0, this
algorithm constructs k compact blocks where machines do not stop between
operations. In block 1 ≤ r ≤ k, m jobs start processing at time (r−1)m and
finishes at time rm. In the last block k + 1, the last l jobs start at km and
finishes at (k + 1)m, but in this block the machines incur some idle interval.
Note that there is a machine (m2) that processes all operations continu-
ously, and Ci(sˆN) =
⌈
σ2(i)
m
⌉
m for all i ∈ N , indeed. Note also that in fact
there are many optimal schedules which can be obtained by just switching
the names of the players.
3 Unit time open shop scheduling games
Under the assumption that there is an initial feasible schedule s0 ∈ S that
describes the initial processing of the operations on all machines, a unit time
open shop scheduling problem with initial schedule s0 is a triplet (N,M, s0).
A cooperative transferable utility (TU) game is defined by a pair (N, v)
where N is the (finite) player set and the characteristic function v assigns a
real number v(T ) to each coalition T ⊆ N , with v(∅) = 0.
For any coalition ∅ 6= T ⊆ N and any feasible schedule s ∈ S, by
cT (s) =
∑
i∈T
ci(s) we denote the waiting cost of the coalition T according
to s. Then, given a unit open shop scheduling problem with initial sched-
ule (N,M, s0), we define the unit time open shop scheduling game (N, v)
where the characteristic function assigns to every coalition the maximal cost
savings it can obtain by means of admissible rearrangements (or admissible
schedules). That is, if AS(T ) ⊆ S denotes the set of admissible schedules
for coalition T ⊆ N ,
v(T ) = cT (s0)− cT (sˆT ),
where sˆT ∈ AS(T ) is such that cT (sˆT ) = min
s∈AS(T )
cT (s).
Clearly, AS(N) should coincide with S under any definition of admissible
rearrangement. Curiel et al. (1993) impose two principles that should be
considered when defining which rearrangements are admissible for a coalition:
(i) The rearrangement should not hurt the interests of the players outside
the coalition.
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(ii) The rearrangement should be possible without an active cooperation of
players outside the coalition.
Following most of the literature on one or multiple parallel machines (see
for instance Curiel et al., 2002) we say that a schedule s, that is compatible
with the unique scheme σ, will be admissible for a coalition ∅ 6= T ⊂ N
if for each machine no player outside the coalition T has a different set of
predecessors as initially. That is, if by σ0 we denote the unique scheme
compatible with s0, for all i ∈ N \ T and all j ∈M it holds
{k ∈ N : σj(k) < σj(i)} = {k ∈ N : σj0(k) < σ
j
0(i)}. (1)
Hence, for a given j ∈ M , switches are only allowed among players from
connected coalitions. A coalition T ⊆ N is called connected with respect to
σj0 if for all i, i
′ ∈ T and k such that σj0(i) < σ
j
0(k) < σ
j
0(i
′) it holds that
k ∈ T . We denote by T/σj0 the set of maximally connected components of T
according to σj0.
We denote the set of admissible schedules for coalition T that satisfies (1)
by AS1(T ). Unfortunately, as shown in Example 4, given T ⊆ N , AS1(T )
might include admissible rearrangements that hurts players outside the coali-
tion T .
Example 4. Consider (N,M, s0) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, M = {1, 2}, and
the initial schedule s0 as follows:
m1 1 2 3 4 5
m2 5 1 3 4 2
.
Let T = {3, 5}. It is easy to check that sˆT ∈ AS
1(T ) is:
m1 1 2 3 4 5
m2 5 1 3 4 2
.
Then, C3(s0) = 4, C5(s0) = 6 while C3(sˆT ) = 4, C5(sˆT ) = 5, and v({3, 5}) =
1. However, one can easily see that sˆT hurts the interests of player 2 who
does not take part of the coalition T , since C2(s0) = 5 < 6 = C2(sˆT ).
The following example shows that, moreover, given T ⊆ N , AS1(T ) might
include an admissible rearrangement that requires the active cooperation of
players outside the coalition T .
Example 5. Consider (N,M, s0) with N = {1, 2, 3}, M = {1, 2}, and the
initial schedule s0 as follows:
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m1 1 2 3
m2 1 3 2
.
Let T = {2}. It is easy to check that sˆ{2} ∈ AS
1(T ) is:
m1 1 2 3
m2 1 3 2
.
Then, C2(s0) = 5, C2(sˆ{2}) = 4, and hence v({2}) = 1. Even though sˆ{2}
delays the operation (3, 1), C3(s0) = C3(sˆ{2}), and hence player 3 is not hurt.
However, changing from schedule s0 to sˆ{2} requires the active cooperation
of player 3. Observe that contrary to s0, in sˆ{2} player 3 decides to process
first (3, 2) instead of (3, 1).
In view of Examples 4 and 5, it is clear that due to the fact that coali-
tions can make use of idle times on machines, condition (1) is not enough
to guarantee the two principles required for the definition of admissible re-
arrangements of a coalition.
In Curiel et al. (1993) a number of different approaches to admissible
arrangements are studied. They combine two different ideas. In the first one,
players in a coalition are allowed to jump over players outside the coalition.
We address this approach in Section 5. In the second one, they simply
focus on the starting time (completion time) of operations of players outside
the coalition. If those times do not increase, they will not be worse off.
We present three proposals, inspired by those in Curiel et al. (1993). The
first one is based on the starting time of operations. That is, a schedule
s ∈ S, with corresponding compatible scheme σ, is admissible for coalition
∅ 6= T ⊂ N if it satisfies (1) and the starting time of operations of players
outside T remains unchanged:
for all i ∈ N \ T and all j ∈M, it holds that, tji (s) = t
j
i (s0). (2)
We denote the set of admissible schedules for coalition T that satisfies (1)
and (2) by AS2(T ).
A second approach considers that a schedule s ∈ S with corresponding
compatible scheme σ is admissible for a coalition ∅ 6= T ⊂ N if it satisfies (1)
and the starting time of operations of players outside T does not increase:
for all i ∈ N \ T and all j ∈M, it holds that, tji (s) ≤ t
j
i (s0). (3)
We denote the set of admissible schedules for coalition T that satisfies (1)
and (3) by AS3(T ).
In Curiel et al. (1993) only one machine problems are studied, hence con-
dition (3) is equivalent to enforcing non-increasing completion times for all
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i ∈ N \ T . Following that spirit, we introduce a new definition of admissible
rearrangements. A schedule s ∈ S with corresponding compatible scheme σ
is admissible for a coalition ∅ 6= T ⊂ N if it satisfies (1) and the completion
time of players outside T does not increase:
for all i ∈ N \ T, it holds that, Ci(s) ≤ Ci(s0). (4)
We denote the set of admissible schedules for coalition T that satisfies (1)
and (4) by AS4(T ).
Clearly, for a given ∅ 6= T ⊂ N , we have AS2(T ) ⊆ AS3(T ) ⊆ AS4(T ).
Moreover, conditions (2), (3), and (4) ensure that admissible rearrangements
will not hurt the interests of players outside the coalition.
On the other hand, one can easily check that in Example 5, sˆ{2} ∈
AS4({2}) and, as noted, changing from s0 to sˆ{2} requires the active co-
operation of player 3. Observe that this is possible because player 3 “makes
use” of the idle times on machines. Given s0 ∈ S and T ⊂ N , a player
i ∈ N \ T can only “make use” of idle times in profit of coalition T to reach
a rearrangement s ∈ AS4(T ), as player 3 in Example 5, if there is a machine
j ∈M such that the initial starting time of operation (i, j), tji (s0), is smaller
than the starting time of (i, j) according to s;
tji (s0) < t
j
i (s).
In Example 5, such machine is m1. Hence, obviously s /∈ AS
3(T ). Then,
admissible rearrangements in AS2(T ) and AS3(T ) do not allow for the active
cooperation of players outside T .
For every different set of admissible rearrangements, we can associate a
cooperative TU-game. Let (N, vk) denote the game where the set of admis-
sible rearrangements for a coalition T ⊆ N is ASk(T ), with k = {2, 3, 4}.
Next, we provide a relationship between the cooperative games defined.
Proposition 6. Let (N,M, s0) be a unit open shop scheduling problem with
initial schedule. Then, it holds
v2(N) = v3(N) = v4(N), and
v2(T ) ≤ v3(T ) ≤ v4(T ) for all T ⊂ N.
Proof. It follows from the observation that AS2(T ) ⊆ AS3(T ) ⊆ AS4(T ) for
all T ⊂ N and AS2(N) = AS3(N) = AS4(N).
4 Non-emptiness of the core
Given a cooperative game (N, v), a payoff vector x ∈ RN represents the
payoffs to the players. Each component xi is interpreted as the allotment
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to player i ∈ N . The total payoff to a coalition S ⊆ N is denoted by
x(S) =
∑
i∈S
xi with x(∅) = 0. In order to study the set of stable allocations of
the total cost savings N can obtain, we introduce the core of a cooperative
game (N, v) that consists of those payoff vectors that satisfy efficiency and
every coalition S ⊂ N receives at least its worth: x(S) ≥ v(S) (Gillies, 1959).
Formally, the core of a cooperative game (N, v) is:
C(v) = {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N), x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N}.
A game is balanced if it has a non-empty core. Given a unit open shop
scheduling problem with initial schedule (N,M, s0), it follows from Proposi-
tion 6 that any core element of the game (N, v4) is also a core element of the
games (N, v3) and (N, v2). Hence, we will focus on the core of the cooperative
game (N, v4). If we show that the game (N, v4) is balanced, then indepen-
dently of the chosen definition of admissible rearrangements, the associated
game will admit stable allocations of the total cost savings.
Convexity (Shapley, 1971) and σ-component additivity (Curiel et al., 1994)
are conditions that have been extensively studied to prove balancedness of
sequencing games associated with different sequencing problems (see for in-
stance Curiel et al., 1994; Hamers et al., 1995; Borm et al., 2002; Musegaas et al.,
2018). One of the requirements for a game (N, v) to be σ-component addi-
tive is that v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N . One can easily check that in Example
5, sˆ{2} ∈ AS
4({2}) and consequently v4({2}) = 1. So, the game (N, v4) is
not σ-component additive. On the other hand, it is well-known that con-
vexity implies superadditivity. A game (N, v) is said to be superadditive if
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N , S ∩ T = ∅. In the next 13-player
example, we show that the game (N, v4) arising from a unit time open shop
scheduling problem with initial schedule (N,M, s0) need not be superadditive
(nor convex). 2
Example 7. Consider (N,M, s0) withN = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13},
M = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and the initial schedule s0 as follows:
m1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
m2 13 12 10 5 4 3 1 2 8 11 6 7 9
m3 4 5 1 2 12 3 6 7 8 9 11 10 13
m4 12 9 2 10 1 3 4 5 11 6 7 8 13
.
Let S = {1, 2}. It is easy to check that sˆ{1,2} ∈ AS
4({1, 2}) is:
2Although Example 7 is a 13-player game, we can show that convexity does not hold
for a 9-player game.
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m1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
m2 13 12 10 5 4 3 1 2 8 11 6 7 9
m3 4 5 1 2 12 3 6 7 8 9 11 10 13
m4 12 9 2 10 1 3 4 5 11 6 7 8 13
.
Hence, v4({1, 2}) = 2. Now, let T = {4, 5}. It is easy to check that sˆ{4,5} ∈
AS4({4, 5}) is:
m1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
m2 13 12 10 5 4 3 1 2 8 11 6 7 9
m3 4 5 1 2 12 3 6 7 8 9 11 10 13
m4 12 9 2 10 1 3 4 5 11 6 7 8 13
.
Hence, v4({4, 5}) = 4. Finally, it is easy to see that sˆ{4,5} ∈ AS
4({1, 2, 4, 5})
is also an optimal schedule for {1, 2, 4, 5}. Then, v4({1, 2, 4, 5}) = 4, and the
game (N, v4) is not superadditive (nor convex).
As the structure of the game does not help to study balancedness, in our
main result we show that a particular allocation of the total cost savings lays
in the core. Given a unit time open shop scheduling problem with initial
schedule (N,M, s0) and in view of Algorithm 2 (see also Example 3), for
all j ∈ M there exists an optimal schedule, that we call sˆjN , for N such
that its unique compatible scheme σˆ ∈ Σ satisfies σˆj = σj0 and, moreover,
machine j does not incur any idle time (operations on machine j are processed
continuously) according to sˆjN . For any j ∈ M we introduce the j-based
allocation µj(N,M, s0) ∈ R
N by:
µji (N,M, s0) = ci(s0)− ci(sˆ
j
N) = Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆ
j
N) for all i ∈ N. (5)
Given j ∈ M , this allocation assigns to each player the difference between
her initial waiting cost and the cost associated with the optimal schedule sˆjN
for N . It is easy to see that this allocation is efficient, since∑
i∈N
µji (N,M, s0) =
∑
i∈N
(ci(s0)− ci(sˆ
j
N)) = cN (s0)− cN(sˆ
j
N) = v
4(N),
where the last equality follows from the fact that sˆjN is optimal for N .
However, as the next example shows, µj(N,M, s0) does not need to satisfy
µji (N,M, s0) ≥ v
4(i) for all i ∈ N , and hence need not be a core element.
Example 8. Consider (N,M, s0) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, M = {1, 2}, and the
initial schedule s0 as follows:
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m1 1 2 3 4
m2 3 4 1 2
.
Let j = {1}. Then, it is easy to check that sˆ1N is
m1 1 2 3 4
m2 2 1 4 3
.
Now, consider i = {3}. Then,
µ13(N,M, s0) = C3(s0)− C3(sˆ
1
N) = 3− 4 = −1 < v
4({3}) = 0.
Hence, the allocation µ1(N,M, s0) is not a core element of the game (N, v
4).
Given (N,M, s0), in Theorem 10 we will show that although the j-based
allocation does not need to be a core element, surprisingly, the average of
all µj(N,M, s0) always belongs to the core. For any (N,M, s0), the average
machine-based allocation rule µ(N,M, s0) is defined by
µ¯(N,M, s0) =
1
m
∑
j∈M
µj(N,M, s0). (6)
In order to show our main result, let us first prove a technical lemma.
Lemma 9. Let (N,M, s0) be a unit time open shop scheduling problem with
initial schedule. Then, for all ∅ 6= T ⊂ N , i ∈ T , it holds
1
m
∑
j∈M
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
≥ Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆT ), (7)
where sˆT ∈ AS
4(T ) is optimal for T .
Proof. Let (N,M, s0), T ⊂ N , and i ∈ T . Let j
∗ ∈M be such that Ci(sˆT ) =
Cj
∗
i (sˆT ). Then, clearly C
j
i (sˆT ) ≤ C
j∗
i (sˆT ) for all j ∈M . Moreover,
Cj
∗
i (sˆT ) ≤
⌈
Cj∗i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m.
Here, if according to sˆT we make consecutive blocks of m units of time from
the moment at which the system starts processing,
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
stands for the
block in which the operation of player i is processed on machine j∗.
We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: Cj
∗
i (sˆT ) =
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m.
Graphically:
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j∗ i
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
It is straightforward to see from the definition of j∗ ∈M that
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m = Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆT ), (8)
and for any other machine j ∈M
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m ≥ Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m (9)
= Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆT ).
Then, from (8) and (9)
1
m
∑
j∈M
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
≥
1
m
∑
j∈M
(Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆT ))
= Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆT ),
which finishes Case 1.
Case 2: Cj
∗
i (sˆT ) <
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m.
Graphically:
j∗ i
⌊
C
j∗
i
(sˆT )
m
⌋
m Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
⌈
C
j∗
i
(sˆT )
m
⌉
m
By definition of j∗, ⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
≤
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
for all j ∈M .
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Let J∗ =
{
j ∈ M :
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
=
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉}
. Note that J∗ 6= ∅ since
j∗ ∈ J∗. On the other hand, if j ∈M \ J∗, then⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
<
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
or equivalently ⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
≤
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
− 1 (10)
To establish an upper bound for |J∗|, notice that all j ∈ J∗, j 6= j∗, process
the operation of job i in the same block as j∗. Additionally, we have Cji (sˆT ) <
Cj
∗
i (sˆT ). So, there are as much as C
j∗
i (sˆT )−
⌊
Cj
∗
i
(sˆT )
m
⌋
m different machines
in J∗, i.e.
|J∗| ≤ Cj
∗
i (sˆT )−
⌊
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌋
m. (11)
Hence,
|M \ J∗| ≥ m−
(
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )−
⌊
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌋
m
)
=
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m− Cj
∗
i (sˆT ), (12)
since
⌊
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌋
=
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
− 1. Then,
∑
j∈M
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
=
=
∑
j∈J∗
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
+
∑
j∈M\J∗
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
≥
∑
j∈J∗
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
+
∑
j∈M\J∗
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m+m
)
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=|J∗|
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
+ |M \ J∗ |
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m+m
)
≥
(
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )−
⌊
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌋
m
)(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
+
+
(⌈Cj∗i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m− Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
)(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m+m
)
=
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)(
m
(⌈Cj∗i (sˆT )
m
⌉
−
⌊
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌋))
+m
(⌈Cj∗i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m− Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
)
=m
[(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
+
(⌈Cj∗i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m− Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
)]
=m
(
Ci(s0)− C
j∗
i (sˆT )
)
= m(Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆT )),
where the first inequality follows from the definition of J∗ and (10). The
second inequality follows from (11), (12), and the observation that for all
j ∈ J∗ and j′ ∈ M \ J∗, Ci(s0) −
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m < Ci(s0) −
⌈
Cj
∗
i (sˆT )
m
⌉
m +m.
The last equality is by definition of j∗.
Consequently, (7) holds and this finishes Case 2.
Now, we can state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 10. Let (N,M, s0) be a unit time open shop scheduling problem
with initial schedule. Then, µ¯(N,M, s0) ∈ C(v
4).
Proof. Let (N,M, s0), µ
j(N,M, s0) = µ
j , and µ¯(N,M, s0) = µ¯. First, we
show that the allocation rule µ¯ ∈ RN is efficient.
µ¯(N) =
∑
i∈N
µ¯i =
∑
i∈N
1
m
∑
j∈M
(
Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆ
j
N)
)
=
1
m
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈N
(
Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆ
j
N)
)
=
1
m
∑
j∈M
cN(s0)− cN(sˆ
j
N)
=
1
m
m [cN (s0)− cN(sˆN)] = v
4(N),
where the fifth equality follows from cN(sˆ
j
N) = cN(sˆ
j′
N ) = cN (sˆN) for all
j, j′ ∈M , j 6= j′. It remains to prove µ¯(T ) ≥ v(T ) for all T ⊂ N .
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µ¯(T ) =
∑
i∈T
µ¯i =
∑
i∈T
1
m
∑
j∈M
µji
=
∑
i∈T
1
m
∑
j∈M
(
Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆ
j
N)
)
=
∑
i∈T
1
m
∑
j∈M
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
σj0(i)
m
⌉
m
)
=
1
m
∑
j∈M
(∑
i∈T
Ci(s0)−
∑
i∈T
⌈
σj0(i)
m
⌉
m
)
=
1
m
∑
j∈M
(∑
i∈T
Ci(s0)−
∑
R∈T/σj0
∑
i∈R
⌈
σj0(i)
m
⌉
m
)
≥
1
m
∑
j∈M
(∑
i∈T
Ci(s0)−
∑
R∈T/σj0
∑
i∈R
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
=
1
m
∑
j∈M
(∑
i∈T
Ci(s0)−
∑
i∈T
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
=
∑
i∈T
1
m
∑
j∈M
(
Ci(s0)−
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m
)
≥
∑
i∈T
Ci(s0)− Ci(sˆT ) = v(T ).
The third equality follows from the fact that the unique compatible scheme
σˆ with sˆjN satisfies σˆ
j = σj0 and moreover, in sˆ
j
N operations are processed
continuously on machine j. So, in view of Algorithm 2 (see also Example
3), Ci(sˆ
j
N ) =
⌈
σj0(i)
m
⌉
m. The first inequality holds due to for every j ∈ M ,
and by definition of AS4(T ), players in R ∈ T/σj0 can only switch their
positions with other players in R. Then, if R = {i1, i2, . . . , ir} and σˆT is the
unique optimal scheme compatible with sˆT , it holds {σ
j
0(i1), . . . , σ
j
0(ir)} =
{σˆjT (i1), . . . , σˆ
j
T (ir)}. Moreover, for ik ∈ R, C
j
ik
(sˆT ) ≥ σˆ
j
T (ik), and hence∑
i∈R
⌈
σj0(i)
m
⌉
m ≤
∑
i∈R
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m. The last inequality follows from Lemma 9.
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5 Relaxed unit open shop scheduling games
In this last section, we study whether the balancedness result still holds
when we relax the definition of admissible rearrangements for a coalition.
We follow the same approach introduced in Curiel et al. (1993) and later
used by Slikker (2006). In particular, we would like to allow the players of a
coalition to jump over players outside the coalition if such a switch does not
hurt them. That is to say, it does not imply an increase in their completion
times.
As Curiel et al. (1993), we first change condition (1) by the following
weaker condition on the schemes:
Let (M,N, s0), ∅ 6= T ⊆ N , and σ0 ∈ Σ denotes the unique scheme
compatible with s0. We say that a schedule s is admissible for T if for all
i ∈ N \ T and j ∈M it holds
σj0(i) = σ
j(i), (1′)
where σ is the unique scheme compatible with s.
Of course, to prevent hurting players inN\T we will combine (1′) with (2),
(3), and (4) to obtain AS2
′
(T ), AS3
′
(T ), and AS4
′
(T ), respectively. For each
new set of admissible rearrangements, we can associate the corresponding
cooperative game (N, v2
′
), (N, v3
′
), and (N, v4
′
). Proposition 11 provides the
relation among these games.
Proposition 11. Let (N,M, s0) be a unit open shop scheduling problem with
initial schedule. Then, it holds
v2
′
(N) = v3
′
(N) = v4
′
(N)
v2
′
(T ) ≤ v3
′
(T ) ≤ v4
′
(T ) ∀T ⊂ N.
In the next theorem, we observe that the game (N, v4
′
) is balanced, and
consequently (N, v3
′
) and (N, v2
′
), too.
Theorem 12. Let (N,M, s0) be a unit time open shop scheduling problem
with initial schedule. Then, µ¯(N,M, s0) ∈ C(v
4′).
Proof. We first observe that Lemma 9 still holds if we consider AS4
′
(T ) in-
stead of AS4(T ). This follows because we do not use any argument based
on the definition of admissible rearrangements. We only employ the specifi-
cations of open shop scheduling problems. In particular, the restriction that
two operations of the same job cannot be processed simultaneously on two
different machines.
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Moreover, Theorem 10 also holds. It is enough to follow the lines of the
proof together with the observation that for T ⊂ N and sˆT ∈ AS
4′(T ) we
have ∑
i∈T
⌈
σj0(i)
m
⌉
m ≤
∑
i∈T
⌈
Cji (sˆT )
m
⌉
m. (13)
So, the inequality we proved for the maximally connected compenents of
T is also satisfied for the full coalition T . In fact, if T = {i1, . . . , it} and
σˆT is the unique optimal scheme compatible with sˆT , by condition (1
′), we
have {σj0(i1), . . . , σ
j
0(it)} = {σˆ
j
T (i1), . . . , σˆ
j
T (it)}. Moreover, for every ik ∈ T
Cjik(sˆT ) ≥ σˆ
j
T (ik) and consequently (13) holds.
To finish, we provide a counterexample to illustrate that further relax-
ations on the admissible rearrangements leads to games that violate bal-
ancedness. Let T ⊂ N , we now admit any schedule for T except if it hurts
players in N \ T , without imposing any condition on the associated scheme.
Let AS
k
(T ) for k = {2, 3, 4} be the set of admissible rearrangements for a
coalition T ⊆ N that satisfy only condition (k), but not necessarily (1) or
(1′). For k = {2, 3, 4}, by (N, vk) we denote the game associated with a unit
open shop scheduling problem with initial schedule (N,M, s0) where the set
of admissible rearrangements is AS
k
(T ) for any T ⊂ N . The relation among
such games is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 13. Let (N,M, s0) be a unit open shop scheduling problem with
initial schedule. Then, it holds
v2(N) = v3(N) = v4(N)
v2(T ) ≤ v3(T ) ≤ v4(T ) ∀T ⊂ N.
Next, we show the non-balancedness result.
Proposition 14. Let (N,M, s0) be a unit time open shop scheduling problem.
Then, the associated game (N, vk) may not be balanced for any k = {2, 3, 4}.
Proof. In view of Proposition 13, it is enough to show that there is (N,M, s0)
such that (N, v2) is not balanced. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, M = {1, 2}, and the
initial schedule s0 as follows:
m1 1 2 3
m2 1 3 2
.
Let T = {2}. It is easy to check that sˆ{2} ∈ AS
2
({2}) is
m1 1 2 3
m2 2 1 3
.
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Hence, v2({2}) = 3. Let T = {3}, it is easy to check that sˆ{3} ∈ AS
2
({3}) is
m1 1 2 3
m2 3 1 2
,
and hence, v2({3}) = 1. Finally, sˆN is
m1 1 2 3
m2 2 1 3
.
Hence, v2(N) = 3, and there does not exist an allocation x ∈ R3 that
satisfies x1 + x2 + x3 = 3, x2 ≥ 3, x3 ≥ 1, and x1 ≥ v
2({1}) since, obviously
v2({1}) ≥ 0. Therefore, C(v2) = ∅.
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